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Abstract 
An increasing amount of regionalist parties has participated in regional or national executive office. 
Their programmatic party behavior is examined here by applying quantitative discourse analysis on 
party manifestos. The data reveal that the regionalist party type employs a specific, multi-dimensional 
party strategy adjusted to the tier of government in question. 
Contrary to expectations, incumbency leads to a perceived ideological persistence on the territorial 
dimension both at the regional and the national level. Moreover, the territorial axis appears to be the 
primary one on which regionalist parties strategize when crossing the threshold of national 
government. In contrast, regional incumbency primarily triggers an increase in salience of the social-
economic and a decrease of the liberal-authoritarian dimension, whilst adopting a more centrist 
position on both axes.  
 
Keywords: Regionalist Parties, Party Strategy, Party Ideology, Multi-Level Governance, Manifesto 
Research 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Introduction 
 
The central research question of this article is situated at the crossroads of regionalist parties and 
government participation. For the first time, the programmatic profile of the regionalist party type is 
quantitatively measured throughout their whole life cycle (1); whereby the impact of government 
participation is mapped (2) on the three main dimensions of ideological party competition (3) and this 
simultaneously at the regional and the national policy making level (4).  
In other words, the effect of crossing the threshold of government (=the “independent” variable) on 
the party ideology (=the “dependent” variable) of regionalist parties is investigated here. 
Programmatic party behavior is operationalized by applying quantitative discourse analysis to three 
identified axes of party competition: left-right, centralization-decentralization and liberal-
authoritarian. This allows for a broad comparison across time (=the postwar II period) and space 
(=Western democracies).  
The central claim in this article is that the applied MARPOR- data show that the regionalist party type 
actually employs a multi-dimensional party strategy when maneuvering into executive office. Different 
programmatic shifts are empirically observed depending on the perspective  of the measurement 
(salience or position) and on the tier of government (regional or national) in question. In brief, the 
findings underneath are an amendment to the theoretical framework on regionalist party strategies 
developed in the Special Issue of Party Politics (2015).  
 
The added value of this research is versatile. First, incumbency effects have already frequently been 
researched. However, since there continues to exist a clear “methodological nationalism bias” 
(Hepburn & Detterbeck, 2013; Schakel, 2013), the regional policy-making level as well as possible 
dynamics between both levels remain a blind spot in academic research. In particular, party 
competition in regional electoral arenas remains under exposed (Fabre & Swenden, 2013). Therefore, 
both regional and national government participation are mapped and included in this research.  
Second, regionalist parties have re-gained electoral momentum in several Western multi-level 
democracies (De Winter & Türsan 1998). An increasing amount of them has by now participated in 
executive office (Elias & Tronconi 2011; Tronconi, 2015). Nowadays, regionalist parties are considered 
as a distinct party family and as a structural actor in political party competition (Gomez-Reino, 2008; 
Hague, Harrop & McCormick, 2016; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002).  
Third, most research on programmatic party competition is focused on the traditional left-right divide, 
whilst the territorial dimension has only been fragmentarily investigated (Alonso, Cabeza & Gomez, 
2015). The same is true for the liberal-authoritarian dimension. Although, the relevance of both post-
materialist axes has gradually increased and is surely relevant with regard to the regionalist party type 
(Cole, 2005; Mc Angus, 2015; Toubeau & Wagner, 2016; Wauters & Bouteca, 2016).  
Fourth, voter behaviour is frequently examined, but the study of party behaviour and party strategy is 
less elaborated (Belanger & Meguid, 2008; Clark & Bennie, 2016; Van Der Brug, 2004). This is partly 
because it is just more difficult to map this aspect. While “established”, “state-wide” parties have 
effectively been subjected to this kind of research the under-exposure is definitely true for regionalist 
parties (Field & Hamann, 2015; Kluver & Sagarzazu, 2015). 
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Fifth, political parties fulfill different functions. Whereas the organizational and electoral one have 
been frequently examined (Fabre & Swenden, 2013), the focus here is solely on its programmatic 
function. When studying the regionalist party type it is particularly for this ideological function that 
one would expect striking contrasts in comparison to other party families.  
Sixth, relatively few comparative discourse analyses include a longitudinal approach (Libbrecht, 
Maddens, Swenden & Fabre, 2009). In contrast, this article counterbalances the limited number of 
selected regionalist parties by observing them for a longer time period, whereby their programmatic 
profile is measured for consecutive electoral cycles.  
Last but not least, to bridge existing research gaps it is important to combine traditional areas of party 
research (e.g. ideological change) with new dynamics such as multi-level governance (e.g. regional and 
national tier of government) (Barrio, 2013).   
 
Contrary to expectations, the conducted descriptive statistics and variance analyses indicate that 
incumbency not necessarily triggers a process of “watering down” the core business of the regionalist 
party profile.  
Regionalist parties who enter regional government clearly show a higher social-economic and lower 
liberal-authoritarian saliency score whilst their territorial salience remains remarkably stable. 
Simultaneously, regional government participation equals to a stable territorial position as well as 
more centrist social-economic and liberal-authoritarian positions.  
Surprisingly, at the national level the decentralization dimension renders even more salient and more 
radical when taking up power in executive office. Simultaneously, the social-economic and liberal-
authoritarian dimension remain rather stable or even slightly decrease in salience terms, and show 
only small and diverging movements in positional terms. 
The ANOVA, correlation and GLM analyses complete the picture of the empirical relationship between 
party ideology and government participation. All of the observed ideological movements can partly be 
explained by the transition to executive office, however government participation alone cannot 
account for the whole of the ideological moves measured on each dimension, even when controlling 
for economic welfare and institutional decentralization. Therefore, other factors will need to be 
investigated. 
  
Indeed, as previous scholars have highlighted, entering government requires regionalist parties to find 
points of convergence with potential coalition partners (Dandoy, 2014, Laver & Budge, 1992). So a 
more centrist stance as well as modified salience scores on the social-economic and liberal-
authoritarian dimension might indicate a willingness to primarily accommodate on these two axes of 
party competition. However clearly visible at the regional level, movements on the latter two axes 
remain rather limited at the national level.  
As aforementioned, the territorial dimension renders even more prominent when in national 
government and is kept constant when in regional government. Since the decentralization issue 
remains regionalist parties’ programmatic core business on which they apparently do not want to give 
in, one could make mention of an “ideological persistence” in this domain as well as of a constitutional 
sense of urgency and awareness (“now or never”).  
 4 
 
Taking up power in regional executive office does not trigger movements on the territorial axis but 
does show important changes on the two others: an increase in social-economic and a decrease liberal-
authoritarian salience whilst also holding more centrist positions on both ideological dimensions. 
Again, the observed “freezing” on the territorial dimension could be due to an ideological persistence 
when it comes to the own core business. On the other hand, the deliberate centrist move on the two 
other dimensions could again indicate a clear willingness to compromise on these two ideological 
domains. Furthermore, at this point an increase in social-economic saliency goes hand in hand with a 
decrease in liberal-authoritarian saliency. The latter cluster of issues is gladly used by regionalist parties 
to narrate their communal feelings expressing a “sense of belonging together”. Taking up 
governmental responsibility however limits them to freely make use of this language, inter alia since it 
can cause friction with coalition partners. A so-called “substitution” party strategy could then help to 
explain this parallel move: regionalist parties express their community-building feelings in an 
alternative way by translating this discourse into social-economic notions (e.g. welfare chauvinism). 
An alternative, adding interpretation for the increased social-economic saliency could be an “inverse 
subsuming” party strategy, whereby regionalist parties articulate their territorial demands (their 
primary axis) through a social-economic lens (their secondary axis). This would be an amendment to 
the existing theoretical framework of party strategies as laid out by Elias, Szocsik & Zuber (2015).   
It has to be noted that party platforms are not the only relevant document to take into account when 
assessing programmatic party strategy (Walgrave, Varone & Dumont, 2006; Mansergh & Thomson, 
2007). The assumption made above rely on quantitative research that stems from only one written 
source of documents. Therefore, these preliminary findings will need to be more complemented with 
broader quantitative as well as in-depth qualitative analysis to further verify and clarify these party 
dynamics. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
The aim of this research to analyse and explain the programmatic dimension of regionalist parties’ 
party behaviour by making use of quantitative discourse analysis. Since most empirical knowledge 
about party change is embedded within the research field of party competition (Downs, 1957; 
Robertson, 1976), this study heavily relies on this segment of the literature segment for its theoretical 
framework.  
Regionalist parties are defined in this research as “parties that refer to geographically concentrated 
minorities which challenge the working order, even the democratic order, by demanding recognition of 
their cultural identity. Regionalist parties articulate discontent at the constitutional status quo of their 
'territory', advocating anything from cultural autonomy to national independence” (Müller-Rommel, 
1998). In line with De Winter & Türsan (1998, p. 204-205) regionalist parties are described here on the 
basis of their ideology, whereby the primary concern of this party type is to reach a form of territorial 
self-governance. Basically, stemming from their origin and nature, the programmatic core business of 
regionalist parties is shaped by their decentralization claim. Schakel (2016) adds that “although the 
definition is based on ideology, it also entails a territorial characterization: regionalist parties are only 
present, as organizations or in terms of electoral activity, in a specific territory of the state. In other 
words, ‘regionalist’ parties are also ‘regional’ (“non-statewide”) or, more precisely, they are a sub-set 
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of regional parties.” While it is clear that regionalist parties move their positions on the territorial axis 
solely in one direction (Alonso, 2012), within this “peripheral” side however, they differ substantially 
ranging from radical to moderate opinions (De Winter & Türsan, 1998), from autonomist to 
secessionist parties (Mazzoleni, 2009). There is a large divergence in assertiveness to demand regional 
autonomy, but no regionalist party can depart its claim for self-determination without losing its own 
identity (Tronconi, 2015). 
Next, programmatic party behaviour is defined in this research as temporal movements in terms of 
salience and position on three main dimensions of party competition: social-economic (left-right), 
territorial (centralization-decentralization) and liberal-authoritarian (migration, security, fabric of 
society). These three ideological axes were identified in line with the works of previous scholars, 
particularly Elias et al. (2015) and Wagner et al. (2017).  
Elias, Szocsik and Zuber (2015) developed a theory of party strategies in a two-dimensional space 
depicted by (1) a “economic left-right” and (2) a “territorial center-periphery” dimension. Due to its 
recent character this promising theory is accompanied by only fragmented empirical evidence. This 
article studies programmatic party behavior inter alia through these two established dimensions of 
party competition and also tests Elias’ recent theory by confronting it with available empirical data.   
Wagner and Meyer (2017) mapped the ideological party profile of radical right parties across Europe 
by applying (1) an “economic” and a (2) “liberal-authoritarian” dimension. The first one clearly overlaps 
with the Elias’ first dimension, the second is a cluster of issues that captures ideological views relating 
to various “identity” topics. Previous scholars have called the latter the “New Politics” dimension or 
the “cultural” dimension (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Kries, 2010). The 
term “liberal-authoritarian” was already used by Kitschelt (1994). This article studies programmatic 
party behavior inter alia through these two dimensions of party competition, but now applied to the 
regionalist party type.   
Both the salience and position approach are applied since both perspectives are widely acknowledged 
to be complementary when it comes to quantitative content analysis. To measure salience and 
position, quantitative discourse analysis is conducted on party manifestos of regionalist parties. The 
“Manifesto Project Dataset” provides a well-established tool to process and compare coded party 
platforms collected throughout different elections at the national level. Three clusters (social-
economic, territorial and liberal-authoritarian) are derived from the MARPOR 1 coding scheme, 
whereby each cluster represents one dimension of party competition. The scores for these three 
clusters are computed and compared over time and across space. 
Whilst the transition to holding power in executive office confronts regionalist parties with similar 
strategic challenges as those of their “state-wide”, “established” counterparts, they might strategize 
and behave differently in response to these challenges. Based on the relevant literature four specific 
expectations are summed up underneath. These hypotheses are subsequently tested by using the 
MARPOR data. The results allow to get a better insight in the effect of crossing the threshold of 
                                                          
1 The Manifesto Project provides the scientific community with parties’ policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties’ electoral 
manifestos. It covers over 1000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents. The MARPOR project continues the 
work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). 
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government (=the “independent” variable) on the party ideology (=the “dependent” variable) of 
regionalist parties. 
Government participation is a strategic choice that implies a trade-off between votes, office and policy 
(Muller & Strom, 1999). Regionalist parties have a particular motivation to take part in national 
governance since the key to the fulfillment of their own ideological core business is located at this level 
(=policy-seeking incentive). Also, the so-called “springboard effect” predicts that it is advantageous to 
participate in national elections just to grow on within the own region (=vote-seeking incentive).  
When focussing on solely the programmatic component of strategic party behaviour, parties react 
within a competitive environment by temporarily making adjustments in the issues they emphasize 
and the positions they take up. Previous scholars have demonstrated that parties who ideologically 
connect more closely have a bigger chance to become partners in a next coalition government (e.g. 
Laver & Budge, 1992), thereby forming “logical” and “homogeneous” coalitions.  When it comes to 
programmatic flexibility, Harmel & Janda (1995) distinguish between the “image” a party creates 
through its issue salience and on the other hand the “identity” formed by the positions it takes up. In 
this respect, Bouteca & Devos (2016) demonstrated that parties are more flexible in the package 
(emphasis) than in the content (position) they defend. 
 
Hypothesis one concerns the national tier of government seen from the salience perspective: 
H1a: When regionalist parties enter national government their social-economic saliency scores 
significantly increase.  
H1b: When regionalist parties enter national government they significantly reduce their territorial 
emphasis.  
Regionalist parties who aspire to enter national government will need to give in on their primary axis 
of party competition, that is the territorial axis (Alonso, Cabeza & Gomez, 2015), to find convergence 
with other “state-wide”, “established” parties. Continued emphasis on the decentralization claim may 
hamper the coalition potential of regionalist parties, especially at the national policy-making level. 
Indeed, decentralization issues have gradually become more salient in European democracies over the 
last decades, but have eventually remained only a marginal point of attention in the whole political 
debate (Basile, 2015). Instead, ideological connectedness will need to be found on the primary axis of 
the “state-wide”, “established” parties, that is, the traditional left-right axis (Heller, 2002; Rovny, 2015; 
Verge, 2013). As a consequence, one may expect the territorial emphasis to decrease and the social-
economic emphasis to increase in the case of regionalist parties crossing the threshold of national 
government.  
 
Hypothesis two concerns the regional tier of government seen from the salience perspective: 
H2a: When regionalist parties enter regional government, their social-economic salience scores 
significantly increase. This effect is larger at the regional level than at the national level.  
H2b: When regionalist parties enter regional government, they do not show a significant lower 
territorial salience score.  
Similar to the first hypothesis, regionalist parties aspiring to enter the regional government need to 
find convergence with other “state-wide”, “established” parties. Again, movement on the social-
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economic axis is most likely. Regionalist parties have a natural preference to primarily govern their 
own region, thereby implementing those social-economic policies that are considered best for the 
welfare of the own people. Cooperation in this field with better experienced coalition partners is even 
recommendable. At the same time, regional government participation grants regionalist parties access 
to patronage resources and the opportunity to use regional institutions to further territorial demands 
(Massetti & Schakel, 2015).   
The incentive to compromise on the demand of self-determination is less present at the regional level. 
It would barely help to create ideological convergence with others since constitutional reform is 
generally decided at the national tier of government (Dion, 1996; Massetti & Schakel, 2013; Massetti 
& Schakel, 2016). Furthermore, other political parties active in the same regional arena often also 
ventilate autonomist sentiments in their discourse (Libbrecht, 2009).  
 
Hypothesis three concerns the national tier of government seen from the positional perspective: 
H3: When regionalist parties enter national government, they become more centrist on the three 
ideological axes.  
Regionalist parties who aspire to enter regional government can also try to establish ideological 
convergence by modifying their issue positions. “State-wide”, “established” parties normally hold 
mainstream policy positions in the center of the political spectrum, whereas regionalist parties 
generally take up positions in the periphery of the spectrum (Hepburn & Detterbeck, 2013). Therefore, 
centrist moves on every of the three axes can be expected.  
 
Hypothesis four concerns the regional tier of government seen from the positional perspective: 
H4: When regionalist parties enter regional government, they become more centrist on the social-
economic and the liberal-authoritarian axes, but not on the territorial axis. 
Similar to the third hypothesis, one would expect a more centrist positioning on the liberal-
authoritarian and social-economic axis when in regional government. For the territorial axis however, 
a stable position is expected. Since party competition on this dimension is likely to be higher within 
the own autonomist region (Fabre & Swenden, 2013), there is less manoeuvring space here for the 
regionalist party if it wants to preserve its issue ownership.  Again, since constitutional reform is 
ultimately decided at the national tier of government, giving in on this issue also would barely help to 
find convergence at this point.  
 
Data and Research Method 
 
The universe of regionalist parties is gradually expanding as they have clearly gained electoral strength 
the last decades. Massetti & Schakel (2016) publicized a comprehensive list of 227 identified regionalist 
parties in 16 Western democracies since the postwar II period. Since this list provides an actual and 
complete overview of this party type it is used as the starting point for case selection in this study. 
Quantitative manifesto analysis is applied by using the 2017b version of the Manifesto Project Dataset 
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– a well-known dataset comprised of coded party platforms, providing a broad range of cases in terms 
of time and space.  
The 227 parties from Massetti & Schakel’s list (2016) are checked with the available coded manifestos 
in the dataset.2 Thirty-six regionalist parties from nine different countries (all Western democracies) 
are mentioned in both the dataset and the list. Twelve more parties are added to this subset since they 
can righteously also be labelled as “regionalist” and contain at least one coded party manifesto in the 
dataset. This amounts to a total of 181 available manifesto-cases (see: Appendix A). 
Initially, the potential number of cases was higher (240), but various coded manifestos were excluded 
from the final selection. It is a difficult trade-off between adhering to theoretical orthodoxy on the one 
hand and maintaining a high number of cases on the other hand, but a deliberate choice was made 
not to compromise on the possibilities to make generalizations at the end on behalf of the regionalist 
party type as a whole. Next to the removal of prominent parties such as CDU/CSU (Germany), UP 
(Northern Ireland) and Swedish People’s party (Finland), other cases were excluded because of missing 
values within the database. In sum,  the remaining 181 cases provide a highly-reliable standardized set 
of figures suitable for advanced comparative quantitative content analysis.  
The main dependent variable, i.e. programmatic party behavior, is operationalized by deriving three 
ideological clusters (social-economic, territorial and liberal-authoritarian) from the MARPOR coding 
scheme. Each cluster represents one dimension of party competition. Earlier factor analyses proved 
that these issues tend to frequently appear together in manifesto’s (Cole, 2005). Bakker and Hobolt 
(2013) already constructed a “social-economic” (twenty issues) and a “liberal-authoritarian”  (sixteen 
issues) cluster for their programmatic research. The territorial cluster here is comprised of merely two 
issues. Note that, since these three clusters do not include all of the existing MARPOR codes, the sum 
of the relative frequencies of the three clusters does not necessarily amounts to 100%. Table one 
provides an overview of the three ideological clusters and the codes from the MARPOR coding scheme.  
Each code represents percentages of the party program devoted to a certain issue. Clustered saliency 
scores are then the sum of a grouping of issues. Indirectly, this salience approach also allows for 
“position” to be computed by splitting the three clusters into bipolar categories, as also shown in Table 
one. Therefore, within each cluster the total “weight” of both poles is corrected so that both sides 
count equal. For the social-economic position the authoritative, broader “RILE” scale is applied. 
Positions are measured on a -100/+100 scale, however, nearly all the cases fall within the -50/+50 
scale, which actually is a more appropriate point of reference. Territorial position equals to 
decentralization saliency minus centralization saliency; RILE position is right emphasis minus left 
emphasis (so: “-“ is left whereas “+” is right); liberal-authoritarian position is liberal frequency minus 
authoritarian frequency (so: “–“ is authoritarian-orientated whereas “+” is liberal-minded).   
 
Table 1: Three ideological clusters (salience and position perspective) 
                                                          
2 Please note that the relevance criterion is higher in the MARPOR dataset. In the list of Massetti & Schakel each regionalist party is included 
which obtained at least 1% of the vote and/or one seat in one national or regional election, whereas MARPOR only takes parties into account 
which obtained at least one seat in national parliament.  
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The main independent variable, namely government participation, is operationalized by a 
dichotomous variable (value “0” or “1”). Both for the regional and national policy-making level this 
variable needed to be mapped for the whole life cycle of the 48 regionalist parties included in this 
study (see: Appendix A). Drafting this overview required extensive historical in-depth research. Up until 
now, only fragmented overviews on this matter existed. For the national level the “0” and “1” values 
were aligned with the existing ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow, 2018), which already provides “0” 
and “1” values for incumbent parties in postwar national governments. In fact, this means that 
coalition support as well as caretaker governments are also labeled as “1”-values here. 
Descriptive statistics and group comparisons (=variance analyses) were performed for the set of 181 
relevant manifesto-cases. Next, additional binary variables are created, allowing to distinguish 
separate effects for the different tiers of governments. Also, two additional ordinal variables 
“PAIRNAT” (1st-5th) and “PAIRREG” (1st-9th) filter out sequential pairs of party’s manifestos before (“0”- 
situation) and after (“1”-situation) their government entry at the respective policy-making level.  
 
Results  
 
a. Descriptive statistics 
Mean values, standard deviations and standard errors are computed for the three ideological clusters. 
Table 2 provides an overview of average salience and position for the regionalist party type along the 
three main ideological dimensions of party competition. Only the most prominent results are reported 
underneath. From the 181 manifesto-cases, 27,6% were publicized during participation in national 
government and 45,9% during regional government incumbency. These figures are in line with 
previous research on affiliated party types (Tronconi, 2015). For sure, the defining criterion of the 
regionalist party type is their devotion to the territorial issue, with an overall average saliency score of 
11,5%. This is a high percentage since this ideological dimension is composed of merely two issues. 
Furthermore, 94% of the statements on this bipolar axis are positioned on the decentralization-side, 
reflecting their firm stance on self-determination. Overall, regionalist parties appear to be principally 
left right decentralisation centralisation liberal autoritarianism
market regulation 403 free market economy 401 de-centralization 301 centralization 302 freedom and human rights 201 political authority 305
economic planning 404 economic incentives 402 democracy 202 national way of life : positive 601
corporatism/mixed economy 405 protectionism : negative 407 anti-growth economy : positive 416 traditional morality : positive 603
protectionism : positive 406 economic growth : positive 410 environmental protection : positive 501 law and order 605
Keynesian demand management 409 economic orthodoxy 414 culture : positive 502 multiculturalism : negative 608
controlled economy 412 welfare state limitation 505 national way of life : negative 602 social harmony 606
nationalization 413 education limitation 507 traditional morality : negative 604
marxist analysis : positive 415 labour groups : negative 702 multiculturalism : positive 607
equality : positive 503 underpriviliged minority groups 705
welfare state expansion 504 non-economic demographic groups 706
education expansion 506
labour groups : positive 701
left emphases right emphases
anti- imperialism 103 military : positive 104
military : negative 105 freedom and human rights 201
peace 106 constitutionalism : positive 203
internationalism : positive 107 political authority 305
democracy 202 free market economy 401
market regulation 403 economic incentives 402
economic planning 404 protectionism : negative 407
protectionism : positive 406 economic orthodoxy 414
controlled economy 412 welfare state limitation 505
nationalisation 413 national way of life : positive 601
welfare state expansion 506 traditional morality: positive 603
education expansion 506 law and order 605
labour groups : positive 701 civic mindedness : positive 606
social-economic territorial liberal-autoritarianism
right-left position ("RILE")
PROGRAMMATIC PARTY BEHAVIOR --> THREE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF PARTY COMPETITION 
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left wing-orientated when looking at the average RILE scale (-9) and at the saliency of leftist (20,9%) 
versus rightist (14,9%) social-economic issues. Concerning the liberal-authoritarian cluster, their 
average saliency is 31,7% but is clearly leaning more towards liberal (24,3%) instead of authoritarian 
topics (6,7%). This is also reflected in their overall (“weighted”) liberal-oriented position (+12) on a 
factual -50/+50 scale.  
 
Table 2: Regionalist party type : Average salience and position  
 
 
Next, the manifesto-cases are split into different groups by introducing the main independent variable. 
This allows for more specific comparisons. Government incumbency is operationalized twice by a 
dichotomous variable with values “0” and “1”, once at the national and once at the regional level (see: 
Table 3).  
Surprisingly, the figures show a higher territorial saliency (10,3% versus 14,6%) for manifestos 
belonging to regionalist parties incumbent at the national level at that moment versus manifestos 
drafted by regionalist parties in national opposition. At the regional level this finding is affirmed, 
although the difference is less outspoken (10,9% versus 12,3%). The expectation of a significant higher 
social-economic saliency when in executive office is confirmed at the regional (24,7% versus 31%) but 
not at the national (27,4% versus 28,7%) level. Also, government participation lowers liberal-
authoritarian saliency both at the regional (34,8% versus 28,1%) and at the national (32,9% versus 
28,5%) level.  
The two binary variables also allow to split the data into four different groupings. These “net effects” 
are visualized in Appendix B. Then, for example at the extremes the discrepancy in territorial (10,7% 
versus 15,9%) and social-economic (24,2% versus 28,7%) saliency scores becomes clearly visible.  
From a positional point of view, shifting from a “0” to a “1” situation at the regional level equals with 
a more centrist stance on the liberal-authoritarian axis (+16,3 versus +6,9) whilst the decentralist and 
left-right opinion remain rather stable (see: Table 3). At the national level however, the shift into 
executive office equals to steady values on the left-right and liberal-authoritarian axis but a more 
outspoken decentralization opinion (+10,2 versus +14,6).  When looking at the “net effects” at the 
extremes (Appendix B), the more moderate stances in liberal-authoritarian (+15,7 versus +9,1) and 
social-economic (-9,6 versus -6,5) topics in situations of government incumbency becomes clearly 
visible, in line with the expectations. Curiously, incumbency vastly strengthens decentralization 
opinions at the extremes (+10,6 versus +15,9).  
When isolating the manifesto’s belonging to parties who ever participated in (any) government, N 
drops to 158 cases (see also: Table 5). Three (VB, PA and SF) of the 48 parties are then filtered out, 
providing an opportunity to also distinguish effects between parties instead of between manifestos. 
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Error Std. Dev.
Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 27,59 0,76 10,23
Avg. Terr cluster salience 11,52 0,6 8,12
Avg. Lib-auth cluster salience 31,68 0,81 10,88
Avg. Ri-le position -9,03 1,02 13,73
Avg. Terr. Position 11,4 0,61 8,2
Avg. Lib-auth position 11,96 1,44 19,34
N=181
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However, this party-wise comparisons does not reveal any notable differences, except that those 
regionalist parties only in opposition are vastly more liberal-orientated (+3,5 versus +13,2), hereby 
confirming the expectation that incumbent regionalist parties tend to converge towards the center of 
the political spectrum. 
Alternatively, manifesto-cases can be split between groups of parties according to whether they ever 
participated in a particular tier over government (N=181 cases: see Table 4). Surprisingly, at the 
national level a lower social-economic (30,2% versus 26%) and a higher territorial (9,1% versus 12,9%) 
saliency score are found among incumbent regionalist parties. In contrast, at the regional level both 
social-economic and territorial saliency scores remain more or less stable but liberal-authoritarian 
saliency is significantly lower (34,7% versus 30,8%) among incumbent regionalist parties. From a 
positional point of view, manifestos drafted when in national government are more centrist on the 
RILE-axis (-11 versus -7,9) as expected, but surprisingly radicalize on the territorial axis (+9 versus 
+12,8) and on the liberal-authoritarian axis  (+8 versus +14,3). At the regional level, positional scores 
prove remarkably stable for the three axes in both governmental and oppositional situations.  
 
b. Variance analysis 
The overall figures above camouflage large variances between cases. Therefore, a series of 
independent T-tests 3 are performed to determine whether the observed differences between groups 
of manifestos or between groups of parties are also statistically significant. With regard to these tests, 
only those results are presented for which the assumption of normality of the dependent variable is 
confirmed (Shapiro-Wilks test) and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is confirmed (Levene’s 
test of equality). Again, only the most prominent results are reported underneath. Significant effects 
are reported with one asterisk when the p-value (Sig. 2-tailed) <0.05; two when <0.01 and three when 
<0.001. 
Primo, discrepancies between manifestos when “in” (value=1) and “out” (value=0) of regional 
government are examined. Significant differences in terms of salience are found for both the social-
economic (higher when incumbent: 24,7% versus 31,1%) and libertarian-authoritarian (lower when 
incumbent: 34,8% versus 28,1%) issues, but not for territorial ones. In terms of position a significant 
difference is found for the liberal-authoritarian axis (less liberal = more centrist when incumbent: +16,3 
versus +6,9) but not for territorial and left-right position. On the other hand, discrepancies between 
manifestos when “in” and “out” of national government are examined – providing a different image. 
Here, there are significant differences in salience for the territorial (higher when incumbent: 10,33% 
versus 14,64%) and for the liberal-authoritarian cluster (lower when incumbent: 32,92% versus 28,5%). 
The positional side of the medallion only reports a significant difference with regard to the territorial 
axis: manifesto’s publicized when in national government indicate a more decentralized discourse 
(+10,2 versus + 14,6) when compared to situations in national opposition. These results are reported 
in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Differences between groups of manifestos 
 
                                                          
3 This is an inferential statistical test that determines whether there is a statistically significant difference between the means in two unrelated 
groups, whereby there is one independent, categorical variable that has two levels or groups and one continuous, dependent variable. 
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Secondo, discrepancies between parties when “in” and “out” of national government are computed 
and reported in Table 4. Significant differences in terms of salience among parties’ manifestos are 
found for both the social-economic (lower when incumbent: 30,2% versus 26,1%) and territorial 
(higher when incumbent: 9,1% versus 12,9%) issues, but not for liberal-authoritarian ones. In terms of 
position, both the territorial (+9 versus +12,8) and liberal-authoritarian (+8 versus + 14,3) axis display 
a significant radicalizing effect – contrary to the expectations. Again, discrepancies between parties 
when “in” and “out” of regional government provide a different image. Here, comparing between both 
situations reveals no significant differences in salience, except for the liberal-authoritarian cluster 
(lower when incumbent: 34,7% versus 30,8%).  
 
Table 4: Differences between groups of parties 
 
 
 
Tertio, creating pairs of manifesto-cases per party just “before” and “after” their entry in executive 
office allows for a time-based analysis, thus detecting policy shifts over time (see: Table 5). These 
sequential pairs are identified in the dataset and labeled by introducing two additional ordinal 
variables - namely  “PAIRNAT” and “PAIRREG”. For each variable value=0 indicates situations “before” 
government entry and value=1/2/3/… indicates situations “after” (consecutive) government entries. 
Consequentially, regionalist parties’ manifestos who have never participated in any government are 
filtered out of this analysis, lowering N (again) to 158 cases (cf. supra).  
For the national level, cases are split between 108 manifestos with value=0 and 50 with value ≥ 1. 
When binary-coding these values by 0=“before”=”0” and (1-5)=“after”=”1” government entry, the 
Perspective In/Out of Reg. Gov. N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. In/Out of Nat. Gov. N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er.
Soc-ec cluster salience 0 98 24,66*** 10,69 1,08 0 131 27,42 10,5 0,92
1 83 31,05*** 8,49 0,93 1 50 28,04 9,58 1,36
Terr cluster salience 0 98 10,9 7,15 0,72 0 131 10,33*** 7,88 0,69
1 83 12,25 9,12 1 1 50 14,64*** 7,97 1,13
Lib-auth cluster salience 0 98 34,75*** 11,28 1,14 0 131 32,92* 11,17 0,98
1 83 28,06*** 9,23 1,01 1 50 28,45* 9,47 1,34
Ri-le position 0 98 -10,29 14,58 1,47 0 131 -9,07 13,08 1,14
1 83 -7,53 12,59 1,38 1 50 -8,91 15,45 2,19
Terr position 0 98 10,82 7,17 0,72 0 131 10,19*** 7,98 0,7
1 83 12,09 9,27 1,02 1 50 14,58*** 8 1,13
Lib-auth position 0 98 16,28*** 21,01 2,12 0 131 11,81 20,52 1,79
1 83 6,85*** 15,81 1,74 1 50 12,36 16,03 2,27
Group Statistics - Independent Samples T test (Total N = 181 cases)
Perspective In/Out of Reg. Gov. N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. In/Out of Nat. Gov. N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er.
Soc-ec cluster salience 0 42 26,88 11,35 1,75 0 67 30,22** 8,67 1,06
1 139 27,8 9,9 0,84 1 114 26,05** 10,78 1,01
Terr cluster salience 0 42 10,36 7,95 1,23 0 67 9,13** 8,97 1,1
1 139 11,87 8,16 0,69 1 114 12,92** 7,25 0,68
Lib-auth cluster salience 0 42 34,69* 11,37 1,75 0 67 33,33 10,53 1,29
1 139 30,78* 10,61 0,9 1 114 30,72 11,02 1,03
Ri-le position 0 42 -9,96 18,28 2,82 0 67 -11,03 14,69 1,8
1 139 -8,75 12,1 1,03 1 114 -7,85 13,06 1,22
Terr position 0 42 10,3 7,93 1,22 0 67 8,98** 9,05 1,11
1 139 11,73 8,28 0,7 1 114 12,82** 7,33 0,69
Lib-auth position 0 42 10,4 23,03 3,55 0 67 7,98* 20 2,44
1 139 12,43 18,15 1,54 1 114 14,29* 18,64 1,75
Group Statistics - Independent Samples T test (Total N = 181 cases)
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territorial axis shows a statistical significant difference both for saliency (higher when incumbent: 
10,4% versus 14,6%) and position (more radical when incumbent: +10,3 versus +14,6). Also, the liberal-
authoritarian salience score is deviant (lower when incumbent: 32,2% versus 28,5%). 
For the regional level, cases are split between 76 manifestos with value=0 and 82 with value ≥ 1. When 
binary-coding these values by 0=“before”=”0” and (1-9)=”after”=”1” government entry, both the 
saliency and position perspective show significant differences on the social-economic as well as on the 
liberal-authoritarian scale. Incumbent situations display a higher social-economic salience (24,4% 
versus 30,9%) and a less leftist (or: more centrist) position (-11,9 versus -7,5) coupled with a lower 
liberal-authoritarian salience (34,4% versus 27,9%) and a less liberal (or: more centrist) position (+19,6 
versus +7,3). Again, at the regional level the territorial scale appears to remain steady with regard to 
salience and position.  
 
Table 5: Time-based analysis before (“0”) and after (“1”) government entry 
 
 
Quarto, one step further would then be to only consider the manifesto-cases of those parties who 
effectively demonstrate a “0” (=before) and “1” (=after) situation at the national level - in other words, 
parties that display both a situation where PAIRNAT=0 and a situation where PAIRNAT=1 (Table 6). 4 
This reduces the N in this analysis further to only 99 cases, which might comprise the results. 5 From a 
salience point of view, now only the territorial cluster shows a significant difference (higher when 
incumbent: 12,2% versus 15,3%). From a positional point of view, two ideological dimensions show 
significant differences: the remaining regionalist parties are more decentralization-orientated (+12,1 
versus +15,2) and less liberal-minded (or: more centrist) (+18,6 versus +9,8).  
Analogously, parties that display both a case where PAIRREG=0 and a case where PAIRREG=1 can be 
assessed (Table 6). The N in this analysis is then reduced to 112 manifesto-cases. In line with 
expectations, a significant higher social-economic (23% versus 30,8%) and a lower liberal-authoritarian 
(34,8% versus 28,9%) salience is detected. When parties enter regional government, they are 
significantly less liberal-orientated (+20,7 versus +8,9) when compared to time periods when they are 
in regional opposition.  
 
                                                          
4 Note that at this point the ordinal independent variables PAIRNAT and PAIRREG are still converted into a binary variable. 
5 Indeed, several regionalist parties under study show missing values at this point: some did only participate at the regional policy level, some 
only show “1” situations, some are only measured at one moment in time, etc. 
Perspective PAIRREG N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. PAIRNAT N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. 
Soc-ec cluster salience 0 76 24,38*** 11,45 1,31 0 108 27,65 10,94 1,05
1 82 30,91*** 8,45 0,93 1 50 28,04 9,58 1,36
Terr cluster salience 0 76 11,13 6,61 0,76 0 108 10,42** 7,73 0,74
1 82 12,34 9,15 1,01 1 50 14,64** 7,97 1,13
Lib-auth cluster salience 0 76 34,4*** 10,97 1,26 0 108 32,21* 10,85 1,04
1 82 27,89*** 9,15 1,01 1 50 28,45* 9,47 1,34
Ri-le position 0 76 (-)11,87* 12,57 1,44 0 108 -9,92 11,38 1,1
1 82 (-)7,5* 12,67 1,4 1 50 -8,91 15,45 2,19
Terr position 0 76 11,04 6,65 0,76 0 108 10,26** 7,84 0,75
1 82 12,17 9,29 1,03 1 50 14,58** 8 1,13
Lib-auth position 0 76 19,56*** 18,29 2,1 0 108 13,57 18,77 1,81
1 82 7,28*** 15,43 1,7 1 50 12,36 16,03 2,27
Group Statistics - Independent Samples T test (Total N = 158 cases)
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Table 6: Regionalist Parties displaying both a “0” and a “1” situation (binary coding) 
 
 
This analysis only provides a global overview between “0” and “1” situations, hereby making 
abstraction of subsequent government participations : even up to nine in the (regional) case of PNV in 
Pays Basque and up to five in the (national) case of LN in Italy). Appendix C provides a fine-grained 
overview of these (national and regional) sequential pairs of manifestos.  
 
Quinto, the binary variables “PAIRREG” and “PAIRNAT” are converted into ordinal variables again, and 
only those paired manifesto-cases showing a “0” and subsequent “1” value are kept for further 
analysis. Each pair resembles a regionalist party going through a period of “immediately before” and 
“immediately after” government entry. 
For the national level, this means that N diminishes to 32 manifestos - that is: 16 pairs stemming from 
12 different regionalist parties. For the regional level N diminishes to 40 manifestos – that is: 20 pairs 
among 15 unique parties. Appendix C provides an overview of these pairs.  
The results of the independent samples T test as reported in Table 7 seem disappointing: neither 
saliency nor position reveal for any of the three dimensions a significant ideological difference rightly 
before (“0”) and after (“1”) government entry! The lack of statistical significant differences could be 
due to the N becoming too low. This low N also renders further examination of 2nd, 3th,.. consecutive 
incumbency situation meaningless. Also, it could be that this time frame is too short to detect 
ideological shifts. Political parties may change their programmatic profile, but have to maneuver with 
caution in order not to lose their credibility and reputation. They may modify their saliency and 
position, however slow and even with a certain delay.  As aforementioned, regionalist parties may also 
display an “ideological persistence” with regard to their primary (territorial) axis when crossing the 
threshold of government.  
 
Table 7: Regionalist Parties displaying both a “0” and a “1” situation (ordinal coding) 
Perspective PAIRNAT N = 99 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. PAIRREG N = 112 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. 
Soc-ec cluster salience 0 60 23,63 11,32 1,46 0 56 22,99*** 9,95 1,33
1 39 25,37 7,39 1,18 1 56 30,82*** 8,23 1,1
Terr cluster salience 0 60 12,17* 6,14 0,79 0 56 11,3 6,53 0,87
1 39 15,27* 6,19 0,99 1 56 11,16 7,35 0,98
Lib-auth cluster salience 0 60 32,41 12,24 1,58 0 56 34,8** 11,31 1,51
1 39 28,21 9,83 1,57 1 56 28,9** 8,43 1,13
Ri-le position 0 60 -7,85 10,62 1,37 0 56 -10,54 11,2 1,5
1 39 -4,28 10,85 1,74 1 56 -7,16 11,82 1,58
Terr position 0 60 12,12* 6,14 0,79 0 56 11,21 6,59 0,88
1 39 15,2* 6,25 1 1 56 10,98 7,54 1,01
Lib-auth position 0 60 18,59* 17,87 2,31 0 56 20,69*** 18,36 2,45
1 39 9,75* 16,58 2,66 1 56 8,89*** 13,8 1,84
Group Statistics - Independent Samples T test 
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c. One Way ANOVA, correlations and GLM  
Next, both dichotomous independent variables (in/out nat. gov. and in/out reg. gov.) are merged and 
converted into one ordinal variable (named “GOVCAT”), which ranges from value=(1) only in 
opposition; (2) solely national government participation; (3) solely regional government participation; 
(4) both national and government participation. 6 A one way- ANOVA analysis enables to compare 
between these four groupings of manifesto-cases simultaneously  - instead of the parallel pairwise 
comparisons conducted in the independent T-tests above. Appendix B shows the descriptive and group 
statistics for these four groupings. Five out of the six dependent variables (except: RILE position) show 
a statistical significant difference at the <0,01 level. 7 
The existing relationship between party ideology (=salience and position scores) and government 
incumbency (GOVCAT(a)) is highlighted once more when computing the correlations, a figure that 
shows the magnitude, direction as well as the statistical significance of the relationship (see: Table 8).  
In contrast, none of the two added control variables, namely economic welfare and institutional 
design, show any significant correlation with the dependent variables. “Economic growth” is 
operationalized by making use of the OECD Data (2018) and for “institutional design” the Regional 
Authority Index Scores (Hooghe et. al., 2016) were applied. Inserting these controls slightly impacts 
the numeric relationship between party ideology and government incumbency, they do not affect it 
fundamentally: see the partial and controlled correlations under (GOVCAT (b). 
 
Table 8: Correlations between party ideology and government incumbency (+ two control variables) 
                                                          
6 Since from the previous empirical findings regionalist parties seem more prepared to maneuver on the ideological dimensions of party 
competition when aiming for regional executive power, situations of regional government entry are categorized as “3”. From their point of 
view, the stakes are thus higher when it concerns regional government incumbency. 
7 However, it is noteworthy that the ANOVA simulation only provides (global) insight into the biggest difference between the four groupings 
and thus not into the (specific) differences between every group. 
Perspective NATPAIR N = 32 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. REGPAIR N = 40 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Er. 
Soc-ec cluster salience 0 16 26,44 7,79 1,95 0 20 27,66 7,16 1,6
1 16 26,49 7,76 1,94 1 20 31,49 8,01 1,79
Terr cluster salience 0 16 13,75 4,7 1,17 0 20 12 7,83 1,75
1 16 14,43 6,85 1,71 1 20 11,74 8,72 1,95
Lib-auth cluster salience 0 16 29,2 10,67 2,67 0 20 31,18 9,95 2,23
1 16 28,66 10,73 2,68 1 20 29,42 9,81 2,19
Ri-le position 0 16 -11,5 8,46 2,12 0 20 -9,35 12,08 2,7
1 16 -5,29 11,55 2,89 1 20 -10,31 11,44 2,56
Terr position 0 16 13,73 4,68 1,17 0 20 11,93 7,92 1,77
1 16 14,32 6,87 1,72 1 20 11,66 8,79 1,97
Lib-auth position 0 16 14,65 16,84 4,21 0 20 13,39 17,02 3,81
1 16 11,17 16,93 4,23 1 20 10,69 13,35 2,98
Group Statistics - Independent Samples T test 
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Finally, a (multivariate) General Linear Model Analysis gives a more specific view on the explanatory 
value of the included variables. Again, both the measurements for economic growth and territorial 
decentralization are inserted as control variables here. 
 
Table 9: GLM (Independent Variable = GOVCAT; Covariates = RAISCORE ; EC GROWTH) 
 
 
In general, the results provide additional empirical evidence for the pairwise findings above. For each 
of the six conducted tests the relationship between government incumbency and party ideology 
proves to be statistically significant at the <0,05 level (see: Table 9). Partial Eta Squared then indicates 
the net explanatory value of the main independent variable for each dependent variable: e.g. 12% of 
the variation in social-economic salience can be explained by the variation in government 
participation. This value ranges between 6 and 12%, which makes it a modest but relevant predictor 
within the discipline of social sciences since a lot of other factors can play a role here. Adding the two 
control variables does not really augment these numbers (see R² for the explanatory value of the whole 
model).   
 
Perspective GOVCAT(a) RAISCORE EC GROWTH GOVCAT(b)
Soc-ec cluster salience Pearson Correlation 0,269*** -0,028 -0,131 0,182*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,74 0,082 0,033
N 181 144 177 136
Terr cluster salience Pearson Correlation 0,158* 0,15 -0,1 0,088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,033 0,072 0,184 0,306
N 181 144 177 136
Lib-auth cluster salience Pearson Correlation (-)0,324*** -0,045 0,119 (-)0,253**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,594 0,113 0,003
N 181 144 177 136
Ri-le position Pearson Correlation 0,085 -0,006 -0,033 0,225*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,253 0,94 0,661 0,008
N 181 144 177 136
Terr position Pearson Correlation 0,154* 0,158 -0,097 0,084
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,038 0,059 0,197 0,325
N 181 144 177 136
Lib-auth position Pearson Correlation (-)0,198** 0,002 0,108 (-)0,238**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,008 0,979 0,153 0,005
N 181 144 177 136
Correlations
Perspective (Dependent variable) Type III Sum of Squares Df F Sig. (two-tailed) Partial Eta Squared R² for corrected model
Soc-ec cluster salience  1257,26 3 6,115 0,001 0,12 0,146 (Adj. = 0,114)
Terr cluster salience       586,205 3 4,999 0,003 0,101 0,117 (Adj. = 0,084)
Lib-auth cluster salience 1061,83 3 3,471 0,018 0,072 0,079 (Adj. = 0,044)
Ri-le position 1283,033 3 3,058 0,031 0,064 0,068 (Adj. = 0,033)
Terr position 586,849 3 4,949 0,003 0,1 0,118 (Adj. = 0,085)
Lib-auth position 3843,793 3 3,49 0,018 0,072 0,082 (Adj. = 0,048)
(Multivariate) General Linear Model - Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Discussion 
 
The conducted variance analyses are summarized in Table 10, which allows to identify a couple of 
trends. 
 
Table 10: Summary of the variance analyses 
 
The four symbols in each grid represent (from left to right): (1) comparison between manifestos with 
n=181 as in Table 3 ; (2) comparison between parties with n=181 as in Table 4; (3) comparison between 
pairs coded as “0” and “≥1”  with n=158 as in Table 5 ; (4) comparison between pairs coded as “0” and 
“1” with n=99 and n=112 as in Table 6. 
With:  
 centr. = more centrist ; rad. = more radical ; ↑increase ; ↓ decrease ; ꓿ no difference 
 01 = shift from opposition (0) to government (1) incumbency 
 
In a situation of national government incumbency both the territorial salience renders higher and the 
territorial position becomes more radical. This is not easy to explain since these findings run contrary 
to hypotheses 1b and 3. Two possible political explanations are suggested. First, national government 
entry might actually trigger regionalist parties even more to endeavor decentralization reforms, since 
these are eventually decided at the national government level, hereby creating a constitutional sense 
of urgency (=“now or never”). Secondly, there may also be an “ideological persistence” among 
regionalist parties, i.e. a reluctance to give in when it comes to their own territorial core business.  
Alternatively, it has to be noted that this awkward move could also be ascribed to methodological 
choices included in this research. For example, the indirect (suboptimal) measurement of policy 
position that is applied here. Furthermore, there is a possible discrepancy between the discourse in 
the party platforms and the actions they undertake in reality. Also, “crossing the threshold of 
government” is only one potential factor influencing party ideology. In addition, the regionalist party 
family is a heterogeneous group comprised of both moderate and radical parties which might lead to 
diverging results when being aggregated (cf. supra). Finally, the coding in “0” and “1” situations lacks 
some nuance: “1” here also includes quasi-opposition situations (caretaker government, informal 
coalition support, etc.).  
Level Cluster
Salience Position
NAT 0 -> 1
Terr. ↑ (1) ↑ (2) ↑ (3)  ↑(4) rad.  rad.  rad.  rad.
Soc-ec. ꓿  ↓  ꓿  ꓿ ꓿  centr.  ꓿  ꓿
Lib-auth. ↓ ꓿  ↓  ꓿ ꓿  rad.  ꓿  centr.
REG 0 ->1
Terr. ꓿  ꓿  ꓿  ꓿ ꓿  ꓿  ꓿  ꓿
Soc-ec. ↑  ꓿  ↑  ↑ ꓿  ꓿  centr.  ꓿
Lib-auth. ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓ centr.  ꓿  centr.  centr.
Perspective
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Regional government incumbency has a different effect on the territorial dimension as it clearly 
remains stable (“freezing”) in terms of both salience and position. This is a confirmation of hypotheses 
2b and 4. Again, this might point to an ideological persistence among regionalist parties when it comes 
to their own core business. Alternatively, regional government participation might not suffice as a 
trigger to maneuver in either direction on the territorial dimension, not only because this would not 
help to create ideological convergence (cf. infra), but also because they are primarily dealing with 
governing issues located within other policy domains at that moment.  
With regard to the social-economic dimension regionalist parties keep their salience and position 
remarkably stable at the national level in between “0” and “1” situations, which runs contrary to the 
hypotheses 1a and 3. Simultaneously, at the regional level this dimension is clearly subjected to 
changes in line with hypotheses 2a and 4: a clear increase in salience but also a tendency to take up a 
more centrist (=less leftist) stance.  
Concerning the liberal-authoritarian cluster, entering executive office tends to lower its salience and 
to encourage regionalist parties to hold a more centrist (=less liberal) position, hereby confirming 
hypotheses 3 and 4. This effect is more outspoken at the regional level than at the national level. In 
other words, for this cluster the strength of the effect depends on the tier of government.  
 
The rich literature on party change and party competition helps to explain these findings. Primo, 
parties do not change their program that easily (“ideological persistence) since they are actually 
collective actors that operate in a context of bounded rationality (Toubeau & Wagner, 2016). Parties 
make rational choices but are also limited by their historical background, their raison d’être, their deep 
ideological roots – which limits their programmatic manoeuvring space if they do not want to lose their 
credibility and reputation (Rovny, 2015; Wagner & Meyer, 2013; Walgrave & De Swert, 2007). At some 
moments programmatic change is more problematic than expected, and some issues are more 
susceptible to change than others. For regionalist parties this might especially be true for their primary 
(territorial) axis of party competition. In this respect, Pogorelis (2005) proved that the specific social, 
historical and ideological background of parties are good predictors of their long-term issue salience 
and position.  
Parties can change their programmatic profile but can also display inertia in between two elections. 
Panebianco (1988) showed that political parties, as “conservative organisations”, have an built-in 
tendency to organisational inertia. This inertia could be assumed more broadly here, i.e. also as 
programmatic inertia, helping to explain the observed “ideological persistence”.   
Several regionalist parties are real issue entrepreneurs (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012; Wagner & Meyer, 
2017) and behave as niche players who timely break into programmatic gaps as they originate from 
the political agenda. For example, important phenomenon’s such as the revival of territorial politics, 
the New Politics movement and the growing importance of post-materialist and non-economic values 
are situated within the same time frame as the development of several regionalist parties (Cole, 2005; 
Zons, 2015). Indeed, strategic party behavior does not take shape in a vacuum but should be seen in 
relation to the behavioral pattern of other parties in the arena. Political opponents react to strategic 
actions (Fabre, 2008) whereby the existing programmatic gaps in the public agenda are (however 
partially and with delay) filled up again. 
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Secondo, the much-debated conceptual difference between “mainstream” and “niche” parties 8 is 
useful because both labels are accompanied by a list of behavioral and programmatic characteristics 
that can be ascribed to them (Meyer & Miller, 2015). For example, niche parties are believed to be 
more policy-seeking and more single-issue, and to focus more on non-economic issues (Wagner, 2012). 
Meguid (2008) originally categorized the regionalist party type as a whole as “niche”, but now authors 
acknowledge that the niche-ness of a party rather varies over time, and that this label cannot be 
attributed to a party family as a whole (Meyer & Wagner, 2013). 
Still, many authors link regionalist parties with the niche party label and its defining characteristics. 
Many regionalist parties primarily claim issues on the territorial axis, while their principal political 
opponents (= the “mainstream” parties) primarily claim issues on the social-economic axis (Alonso, 
Cabeza & Gomez, 2015). Walgrave & De Swert (2007) even argue that a “division of labour” arises on 
the basis of which political parties start to specialize and differentiate from each other. Again, this can 
partly explain why regionalist parties are reluctant to give in to their primary (territorial) dimension 
and more willing to move on their secondary (social-economic and liberal-authoritarian) dimension.  
Tertio, the location of a political party within the “center-periphery” spectrum is a reliable predictor 
for its susceptibility for ideological party change (Mazzoleni, 2009). “Peripheral” parties, among which 
the regionalist parties are frequently categorized (Tronconi, 2015), are associated with policy-seeking 
strategies and are considered ideologically less flexible compared to “centrist” parties. The latter are 
more associated with vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies. Peripheral parties’ ideology is more 
resistant to external shocks and they are less willing to change their salience or position since they are 
under the compelling supervision of a loyal rank and file (Mazzoleni, 2009). 9 Again, these behavioral 
characteristics can help to explain the observed reluctance among regionalist parties to move on their 
territorial core business, but also gives insight in the rather limited movements on the two other 
ideological dimensions when it concerns the national policy-making level. At the regional level the 
movements on both secondary axes are of a bigger magnitude: this discrepancy between the two 
policy-levels requires further explanation as well (cf. infra).  
Quarto, previous scholars have demonstrated that newer and younger parties have a sharper 
ideological profile and thus have a stronger issue ownership (Walgrave & De Swert, 2007). Regionalist 
parties often belong to this younger category (Wagner, 2012). Hepburn (2009) demonstrated that 
regionalist parties will only thicken their profile over time as they enter into continued electoral 
competition with “established”, “state-wide” parties. This process of programmatic broadening comes 
with a delay, however, again helping to explaining ideological “freezing” at some moments (cf. supra).  
Quinto, regionalist parties may prefer not to give in to their territorial core business but are rather 
flexible on the two other dimensions of party competition. Adopting such a multi-dimensional party 
strategy adds to understand the moves on the social-economic and the liberal-authoritarian axes. 
These moves are more outspoken at the regional level than at the national level, maybe reflecting 
regionalist parties’ natural preference to govern their own region over co-governing at the national 
level. The deliberate centrist move on both dimensions at the regional level then shows a clear 
willingness to compromise on these two domains in order to create ideological convergence with 
                                                          
8 In terms of salience, “niche” is the degree to which an issue highlighted by one party is neglected by its political opponents, while in terms 
of position “niche” mainly refers to the ideological distance between parties on a same (non-economic) issue. Therefore, “niche” is not an 
obsolete but rather a relational label: the niche-ness of a party depends on the issue emphasis and issue position of political opponents – 
factors that are susceptible to temporal variation.  
9 Mazzoleni also demonstrated that peripheral parties have kept their emphasis for decentralization rather constant over time (2009).  
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potential coalition partners (cf. supra). This double centrist move on the positional perspective is in 
line with the expectations.  
And whilst the higher social-economic salience is an affirmation of the expectation, the lower liberal-
authoritarian salience isn’t. The latter cluster of issues is gladly used by regionalist parties to narrate 
their communal feelings expressing a “sense of belonging together”. Taking up governmental 
responsibility however deprives them to freely make use of this (often polarizing) language, inter alia 
since it can cause friction with coalition partners. A so-called “substitution” party strategy could then 
help to explain this parallel move: regionalist parties express their community-building feelings in an 
alternative way by translating this discourse into social-economic notions (e.g. welfare chauvinism). 
An alternative, adding interpretation for the increased social-economic saliency could be an “inverse 
subsuming” party strategy, whereby regionalist parties articulate their territorial demands (their 
primary axis) through a social-economic lens (their secondary axis). This assumption amends the 
existing theoretical framework of party strategies as laid out by Elias, Szocsik & Zuber (2015).   
In any way, these explanations share the idea that regionalist parties alternate between dimensions of 
party competition, and thus employ a rather specific, multi-dimensional part strategy adjusted to the 
tier of government in question.   
Lastly, there is the pairwise comparison of chronological couples of parties’ manifestos showing 
consecutively a “0” and “1” situation. This was the last step in the conducted variance analyses (ordinal 
coding, see Table 7). The output seemed disappointing since no significant difference was found 
between immediately “before” and “after” government entry. This finding could be due to “ideological 
persistence” but rather highlights that party ideology needs to be observed over a longer time span 
and depends also on other variables than solely government participation.   
The ANOVA, correlation and GLM analyses complete the picture of the empirical relationship between 
party ideology and government participation. All of the observed ideological movements can partly be 
explained by the transition to executive office, however government participation alone cannot 
account for the whole of the ideological moves measured on each dimension, even when controlling 
for economic welfare and institutional decentralization. Therefore, other factors will need to be 
investigated. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Regionalist parties employ a multi-dimensional party strategy when maneuvering into executive office. 
The territorial demand is and remains their programmatic core business, rendering it even more 
prominent when entering national government while keeping it constant when entering regional 
government. This is contrary to expectations and might be due to an “ideological persistence” as well 
as to a constitutional “sense of urgency” among these regionalist parties.  
Political parties operate in a context of bounded rationality which limits their programmatic 
maneuvering space more than one would initially expect. Regionalist parties, often categorized as 
“niche”, “peripheral”, and “newer” parties, are particularly reluctant to move on their primary 
(territorial) axis of party competition.   
Movements on the two other dimensions of party competition are rather limited when entering 
national government but more outspoken in the case of regional government incumbency. This 
 21 
 
willingness to compromise on other domains is actually necessary if regionalist parties want to create 
ideological convergence with potential coalition partners. In brief, regionalist are not inclined to give 
in to their territorial core business but are rather flexible on social-economic and liberal-authoritarian 
issues.  
With regard to the social-economic dimension the results are in line with the expectations at the 
regional level but are in contrast with the hypotheses put forward at the national level. Since this 
dimension constitutes the primary axis of most “established”, “state-wide” parties, it is most likely that 
ideological convergence will need to be found here. The natural preference of regionalist parties to 
primarily govern their own region over co-governing at the national level can be the trigger to initiate 
bigger shifts within this domain at the regional than at the national level. 
For the liberal-authoritarian cluster the strength of the saliency and positional effect clearly depends 
on the tier of government. When crossing the threshold of government regionalist parties hold a more 
centrist position on this axis, hereby confirming the hypotheses at the regional as well as at the national 
tier of government.  
There were no specific expectations formulated on beforehand concerning salience for this third 
dimension, but a decrease at both policy-levels is visible in the results. Since government incumbency 
hampers the ability to hold a polarizing community-building discourse as captured by the liberal-
authoritarian cluster, regionalist parties might opt to “substitute” this language for a similar narrative, 
however now expressed in social-economic terms (e.g. welfare chauvinism), which simultaneously 
explains the increased social-economic saliency. Alternatively, increased social-economic saliency can 
be explained by an “inverse subsuming” party strategy whereby regionalist parties articulate their 
territorial demands (their primary axis) through a social-economic lens (their secondary axis). This 
would be an amendment to the existing theoretical framework of party strategies as laid out by Elias 
et al (2015).  
In any way, these explanations share the idea that regionalist parties alternate between dimensions of 
party competition, and thus employ a specific, multi-dimensional party strategy adjusted to the tier of 
government in question. It is the central claim of this article. Having used two possible benchmarks for 
measurement, i.e. comparisons between manifestos and between parties, it is noteworthy that the 
former is preferred since it actually provides more detail and nuance in the assessment. As an avenue 
for further research, to get a better insight in the relationship between party ideology and government 
incumbency, ideological change and stability probably needs to be observed over a longer time span 
and by other means that just party manifesto’s.  
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Appendix A:  
The case selection of the regionalist parties (motivation and overview) 
 
Next to the thirty-six initially identified regionalist parties, the following twelve parties were included 
on personal initiative in this study: Foro Asturia, EH Bildu, En Comun, Compromis-Equo, Amaiur, 
Democràcia i Libertat, South Schleswig Voters Union, En Marea, A La Valencianna, Autonomy Liberty 
Democracy, Swedish People’s Party, In Common We Can. 
From the 240 potential manifesto-cases, the following were excluded: 
UUP a.d. 1949 (NIRE, rowe 203) : missing values for the frequencies of nearly all the categories (-1) 
 
and UUP a.d. 1921 + 1933 + 1938 + 1945 + 1953 + 1958 + 1965 + 1969 (NIRE, rowe 197, 200, 201, 
202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208) : no territorial score attributed (missing values) for several years, and 
finally opted not to classify this as a regionalist party. (-8)  whole UP (-12) 
also: UP a.d. 1965 (NIRE, rowe 207): no score attributed to the liberal-authoritarian scale 
(missing values in the frequencies of several categories) 
 
LdT a.d. 2011 (CH, rowe 178) : missing values for the frequencies of different codes (-1) 
 
LN a.d. 2006 (ITA, rowe 52): no score attributed to the territorial scale (missing values) (-1) 
 
CDU/CSU a.d. 1957 + 1961 + 1965 + 1969 + 1972 + 1990 + 1994 (GER, rowes 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 
158, 164, 166): finally opted not to classify this as a regionalist party but rather as a regional party.  (-
7)  whole CSU (-19) 
 
SF a.d. 1997 + 2002 + 2011 (IRE, rows 210, 211, 213): no score attributed to the territorial scale 
(missing values). Finally opted not to classify this as a regionalist party (-3) whole SF (-5) 
 
SFP a.d. 1945 + 1948 + 1951 + 1954 + 1966 + 1987 + 1991 + 1995 + 1999 (FIN, rowes 223, 224, 225, 
226,  229, 235, 236, 237, 238): no score attributed to the territorial scale (missing values).  Finally 
opted not to classify this as a regionalist party (-9)  whole SFP (-19) 
 
UP a.d. 2016 (ESP, rowe 141): Podemos is actually not a regionalist party as the research object is 
strictly defined in this study, although it is categorized as such in the MARPOR database. (-1) 
 
FDF and PRL-FDF are considered as a whole, as one continuous political formation. This is open for 
debate, but FDF constitutes an major faction with the electoral alliance PRL-FDF. Same logic is 
applied in the case of Compromis, En Marea, En Comun.  
 Finally, 181 manifesto-cases remain.  
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PARTY FULL NAME COUNTRY
IN/OUT CMP 
DATASET
IN/OUT S&M 
CLASS.
IN/OUT OWN 
STUDY
NUMBER OF CODED 
MANIFESTOS
REGIONAL GOV PARTICIPATION NATIONAL GOV PARTICIPATION
VU Volksunie BEL IN IN IN
13 + 1 CVV + 1 in 
cartel with ID21 
1981-1985 and 1988-1995 and 1999-2003 
(Flanders) and 1989-1999 (Brussels)
1977-1979 and 1988-1991
FDF Front Democratique Francophone BEL IN IN IN 10 + 2 cartel with PRL 1989-2004 and 2014-… (Brussels) 1977-1980 and 1999-2003
RW Rassemblement Wallon - Walloon Rally BEL IN IN IN 6 Only in opposition 1974-1977
N-VA
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie - New Flemish 
Alliance 
BEL IN IN IN
3 (+ 1 own coding 
(2014)) 
2004-2014 (Flanders) 2007-2008 and 2014-…
VB Vlaams Belang - Flemish Interest BEL IN IN IN 10 Only in opposition Only in Opposition 
BQ Bloc Quebecois CAN IN IN IN 8 Only active in general elections
2006-2011 (0,5 min. Gov. support oa. Budget 
approval)
LDT Ticino League CH IN IN IN 2 1995-... (Ticino) Only in Opposition 
MCG Geneva Citizens' Movement CH IN IN IN 1 2013-... (Geneva) Only in Opposition 
EE Basque Left - Euskadiko Ezkerra ESP IN IN IN 5 1978-1980 and 1991-1993 (Basque) Only in Opposition 
PAR
Aragonese Regionalist Party - Partido 
Aragonés
ESP IN IN IN 6 1987-1993 and 1995-2005 (Aragon) Only in Opposition 
PNV
Basque Nationalist Party - Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco
ESP IN IN IN 13
1978-2009 and 2012-… (Basque) and 
1999-2003 (Navarre)
1982-1986 and 1993-2000 and 2015-2016 (0,5 
caretaker) and 2016-2018 
EA Basque Solidarity - Eusko Alkartasuna ESP IN IN IN 6
1991 and 1995-2009 (Basque) and 1999-
2003 (Navarre)
Only in Opposition 
PA Andalusian Party - Partido Andalucista ESP IN IN IN 6 Only in opposition (Andalucia) Only in Opposition 
CHA Aragonist Council - Chunta Aragonesista ESP IN IN IN 2 2015-… (Aragon) Only in Opposition 
UPN
Navarrese People's Union - Unión del 
Pueblo Navarro
ESP IN IN IN 2 1991-1995 and 1996-2015 (Navarra) 2011-2015
GBAI
Gerao Bai - Future Yes  (= PNV+ in Region 
of Navarre)
ESP IN PNV since 2015 IN 1 2015-… (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
FAC Asturias Forum - Foro Asturia ESP IN OUT IN 1 2011-2012 (Asturias) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
EH Bildu Basque Country Unite - EH Bildu ESP IN OUT IN 2 2015-… (Navarra) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
BNG
Galician Nationalist Bloc - Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego
ESP IN IN IN 5 2005-2009 (Galicia) 2004-2008
ECP
En Común Podemos (in Catalunia) - In 
Common We Can (= part of UPodemos)
ESP IN OUT IN 2 Only in opposition (Catalunia) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
CQ Coalicio Compromis - Compromis-Equo ESP IN OUT IN 1 2015-2019 (Valencia) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
EM
En Marea - In Tide = ANOVA + Podemos + 
EU (Galicia) = Deel Upodemos 
ESP IN OUT IN 2 Only in opposition (Galicia) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
CPE
Compromís (=CQ)–Podemos–És el 
moment Commitment - We can It is time 
(=since 2016 : "A La Valencianna")
ESP IN OUT IN 2 2015-... (Valencia) 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
CC Canarian Coalition - Coalición Canaria ESP IN IN IN 8 1993-… 1996-2008 and 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
CIU
Convergence and Union - Convergència i 
Unió (=CDC+UDC)
ESP IN IN IN 10 1980-2003 and 2010-2015 1993-2004
CDC
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia - 
Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya
ESP IN IN IN 1 1980-2003 and 2010-2017 1993-1996 and 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
ERC
Catalan Republican Left - Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya
ESP IN IN IN 13 1984-1988 and 2003-2010 and 2015-2017 2004-2008 and 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
AMA Amaiur (=predecessor GBAI = EA+Aralar) ESP IN OUT IN 1
Electoral alliance, only active in the 
general elections ESP 2011 and 2015
2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
DL
Democracy and Freedom - Democràcia i 
Libertat  (=CDC+ in 2015)
ESP IN OUT IN 1 1980-2003 and 2010-2017 1993-1996 and 2015-2016
UP United We Can - Unidos Podemos in 2016 ESP IN OUT OUT 1 Only in Opposition 2015-2016 (0,5 caretaker gov.)
SFP
Swedish People’s Party - Svenska 
folkpartiet i Finland 
FIN IN OUT OUT 19
20 regions in FIN but no regional 
elections (only municipal and national 
elections)
1945-1946 and 1948-1954 and 1954-1957 and 
1958-1959 and 1962-1964 and 1966-1968 and 
1970 , 1972 and 1975-1977 and 1979-2015
CDU/CSU
Christian Democratic Union/Christian 
Social Union
GER IN IN OUT 19 1946-… (Bayern) 1949-1969 and 1980-1998 and 2005-…
BP Bavarian party GER IN IN IN 1 1954-1957 and 1962-1966 (Bayern) Only in Opposition 
SSW South Schleswig Voters Union GER IN OUT IN 1 2005-2005 and 2012-… (Schleswig) Only in Opposition 
PDS Party of Democratic Socialism GER IN IN IN 4 + 1 kartel Die Linke
1998-2006 (Mecklenburg) and 2002-2011 
(Berlin) and 1994-2002 (0,5 Sachsen ;  SPD-
led min. gov. support)
Only in Opposition 
PDS* Party of Democratic Socialism (EAST) GER IN IN IN 1
1998-2006 (Mecklenburg) and 2002-2011 
(Berlin) and 1994-2002 (0,5 Sachsen ;  SPD- 
led min. gov. support)
Only in Opposition 
UP Ulster Unionist Party NIRE IN IN IN 13 1921-1975 and 1998-2003 and 2007-2016
1922-1923 and 1924-1929 and 1931-1945 and 
1951-1964 and 1970-1974
LN Lega Nord ITA IN IN IN 7 1994-…
1994-1996 (0,5 caretaker) and 2001-2006 and 
2008-2011 (0,5 technocraten) and 2018-…
SVP
South Tyrolean People’s Party - Südtiroler 
Volkspartei
ITA IN IN IN 2 1948-2017
1968-1972 and 1994-1996 (0,5) and 2006-2008 
(1) and 2008-2011 (0,5) 
ALD
Autonomy Liberty Democracy (Aosta 
Valley) - Autonomie Liberté Démocratie
ITA IN OUT IN 1 Only in opposition (Aoste Valley) 2006-2008 (1) 
VdA = UV
Autonomy Progress Federalism Aosta 
Valley = Valdostan Union in national 
elections
ITA IN IN IN 1
1946-1954 and 1959-1966 and 1974-1990 
and 1993-2017
1994-1996 (0,5 caretaker gov.) 
PC Plaid Cymru UK IN IN IN 1 2007-2011 Only in Opposition 
SNP Scottish National Party UK IN IN IN 4 2007-2017 Only in Opposition 
UUP Ulster Unionist Party UK IN IN IN 4 1921-1975 and 1998-2003 and 2007-2016
1922-1923 and 1924-1929 and 1931-1945 and 
1951-1964 and 1970-1974
DUP Democratic Unionist Party UK IN IN IN 4 1998-2003 and 2007-2017 2017-…
SF Sinn Fein - We Ourselves UK (NIRE) IN IN IN 3 1998-2003 and 2007-2017 Abstention
SF Sinn Fein - We Ourselves IRE IN IN IN 5 Unitary state Only in Opposition 
SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party UK IN IN IN 1 1974-1975 and 1998-2003 and 2007-2016
Informal support to Labour Whip in 1974-1979 
and 1997-2010
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Appendix B: Salience and Position scores in four different scenario’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In/Out of Nat. Gov. In/Out of Reg. Gov. "GOVCAT" Perspective N Mean
0 0 1 Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 82 24,28
1 Avg. Terr cluster salience 82 10,70
1 Avg. Lib-auth cluster salience 82 34,83
1 Avg. Ri-le position 82 -9,57
1 Avg. Terr. Position 82 10,63
1 Avg. Lib-auth position 82 15,68
0 1 2 Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 49 32,68
2 Avg. Terr cluster salience 49 9,70
2 Avg. Lib-auth cluster salience 49 29,72
2 Avg. Ri-le position 49 -8,23
2 Avg. Terr. Position 49 9,45
2 Avg. Lib-auth position 49 5,32
1 0 3 Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 16 26,64
3 Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 16 26,64
3 Avg. Lib-auth cluster salience 16 34,37
3 Avg. Ri-le position 16 -13,98
3 Avg. Terr. Position 16 11,80
3 Avg. Lib-auth position 16 19,36
1 1 4 Avg. Soc-ec cluster salience 34 28,70
4 Avg. Terr cluster salience 34 15,93
4 Avg. Lib-auth cluster salience 34 25,66
4 Avg. Ri-le position 34 -6,53
4 Avg. Terr. Position 34 15,90
4 Avg. Lib-auth position 34 9,06
Descriptive Statistics per policy-level (net effects) (Total N = 181 cases)
Perspective Sum of Squares df F Sig.
Soc-ec cluster salience *** 2226,50 3,00 7,91 0,000
Terr cluster salience ** 881,37 3,00 4,74 0,003
Lib-auth cluster salience *** 2346,22 3,00 7,29 0,000
Ri-le position 661,10 3,00 1,17 0,322
Terr position ** 926,10 3,00 4,89 0,003
Lib-auth position ** 4459,81 3,00 4,19 0,007
Group Statistics-One Way ANOVA (Total N = 181 cases) Between&Within Groups
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Appendix C  
 
a) Pairs of “0” and “1” situations at the national policy making level (ranging from 1 to 5 consecutive 
government participations) 
 
 
 
b) Pairs of “0” and “1” situations at the regional policy making level (ranging from 1 to 9 consecutive 
government participations) 
 
 
PARTY PAIRNAT 1 PAIRNAT 2 PAIRNAT 3 PAIRNAT 4 PAIRNAT 5
BNG 2000-2004 2008
BQ 2004-2006 2008 2011
CC 1993-1996 2000 2004 2008
CC 2011-2015 2016
CIU 1989-1993 1996 2000 2004
ERC 2000-2004 2008
ERC 2011-2015 2016
FDF 1974-1977 1978
LN 1992-1994 1996 2001 2006 2008
NVA 2003-2007
PNV 1979-1982 1986
PNV 1989-1993 1996 2000
PNV 2011-2015 2016
RW 1971-1974 1977
VU 1974-1977 1978
VU 1987-1991
PARTY PAIRREG 1 PAIRREG 2 PAIRREG 3 PAIRREG 4 PAIRREG 5 PAIRREG 6 PAIRREG 7 PAIRREG 8 PAIRREG 9
BNG 2004-2008
CIU 1979-1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000
CIU 2008-2011
DUP 1997-2001 2015
EA 1993-1996 2000 2004 2008
EE 1979-1982
ERC 1982-1986
ERC 2000-2004 2008
ERC 2011-2015 2016
FDF 1987-1991
LN 1992-1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013
PAR 1986-1989 1993 2000
PDS 1990-1994 1998 2002 2005
PNV 1977-1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008
PNV 2011-2015 2016
SF 1997-2001 2015
SNP 2001-2015
UUP 1997-2001 2015
VU 1978-1981 1985
VU 1987-1991 1995 1999
